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Abstract In this paper I study how financial frictions affect robustness of monetary
policy in DSGE models in the case of model uncertainty. The types of frictions I consider are
financial accelerator and collateral constraints. Modeling monetary policy in terms of optimal
interest rate rules, I find that welfare-maximizing policies for the models with financial
frictions are robust to model uncertainty. Policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian
model is not robust. Thereby I show that when there is uncertainty about what type of
frictions is at work, a policymaker exposes economy to risks of significant welfare losses by
using a reference model without frictions as economy representation. Using fault tolerance
approach I find that modified policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian model is
robust when it allows to respond to fluctuations in output.
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1 Introduction
It has been claimed that model uncertainty is not a trivial problem for monetary policy-
making (Greenspan, 2004; King, 2004). In particular, it is often (if not always) the case that
central bank does not know the true structure of economy with full certainty, and thus has to
allow for the possibility of economy to be represented by several models. The phenomenon of
model uncertainty could be illustrated by a situation when the members of monetary policy
committee do not agree on a model that represents the true structure of economy. Thus, a
decision on the stance of monetary policy that has to be made by the committee has to be
acceptable in all the alternative economy representations in order to be supported by all the
committee members, i.e. the policy should be robust to model uncertainty.
A particular relevance of model uncertainty is induced by the fact that in aftermath of
the financial crisis 2007-2009 there is a growing debate about what amplification mechanisms
are conductive to economic distress. It has been widely acknowledged that financial factors
have significantly contributed into the recent economic decline. But which of the factors
play the principal role in economic developments is a subject to disagreement; considerable
uncertainty surrounds the true amplification mechanism. While there is a number of studies
revealing empirical relevance of financial accelerator mechanism: Bernanke et al. (1999),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Mody and Taylor (2004), Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010),
Peersman and Smets (2005), Almeida et al. (2006), Cavalcanti (2010); there is also evidence
on significance of collateral constraints as a factor behind aggregate fluctuations: Fazzari et
al. (1988), Gertler et al. (1991), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard et al. (1995),
Kashyap et al. (1994). Financial accelerator as a principal factor behind the financial crisis
2007-2009 has been advocated by Krishnamurthy (2010) and Geanakoplos (2009), whereas
collateral constraints are supported by Chatterjee (2010) and Peralta-Alva (2011 a,b). Other
types of financial factors are also claimed to might have underpinned the crisis: disruption of
financial intermediation (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gertler
and Karadi, 2011), the transmission of contagion (Mendoza and Quadrini, 2010), asset price
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bubbles (Farhi and Tirole, 2011, Martin and Ventura, 2011), credit shocks (Christiano et
al., 2008, Del Negro et al., 2010) and other. As a result, different models that incorporate
financial factors have been developed recently.
In the meantime there is no agreement about what financial factors are responsible for the
recent economic decline, so there is no consensus about what is a ”true” model that captures
relevant type of frictions. Various models could be used as economy representations for
analysis of monetary policy transmission mechanism with different degree of confidence in
these models being realistic. This gives rise to relevance of the issue of model uncertainty
with respect to financial frictions.
Robustness of monetary policy to model uncertainty has been addressed within several
methodological approaches. The first one proposed by Brainard (1967) and developed by
Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b, 2002, 2003, 2007) considers robustness with respect to a
benchmark model. Alternative models are supposed to lie around the benchmark at some
small distance; thus, the set of alternative models could be thought of as being local. Within
this approach optimal policy is found by solving minimax problem for the cloud of models
surrounding the benchmark. This methodology is employed in a number of works analyz-
ing monetary policy robustness, for example, in Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2005), Giannoni
(2002), Marcellino and Salmon (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002) and Tetlow et al. (2001).
The range of alternative models considered in these works is restricted by focus of methodol-
ogy on the small set of reference models; thus, models with significantly different perspectives
about inflation persistence, expectations formation or amplification mechanisms could hardly
be analyzed in the context of this methodological approach.
An alternative approach to address model uncertainty is model averaging. It was initially
advocated by McCallum (1988) who claimed that robust policy should be defined as the one
that works well enough in all the models considered; a robust rule might not be the best one
for any of the models in the set but it should be acceptable (in terms of losses or welfare costs)
for all the alternative models. The principal value of this approach is that it does not require
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alternative models to be close enough to the benchmark. This is important for analysis of
monetary policy transmission mechanism, because possible economy representations are not
necessarily similar. Indeed, these are disparate models of economy that one would typically
want to take into account when looking for robust monetary policy; this is the case of
uncertainty about the factors that are behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This is the
reason why this paper adheres to model averaging methodology.
Model averaging approach is adopted in a number of works with the aim of arriving at
an interest rate rule - Taylor rule or another type of simple rule, - which is robust across
a particular set of models. Brock et al. (2007) examine uncertainty about the suite of
backward-looking models in style of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and hybrid models a la
Rudebusch (2002) analyzing model uncertainty with respect to formulations of expectations
and lag strength structure. Levine et al. (2008) study different variants of Smets and Wouters
model (2003). Levin and Williams (2003) search for a simple rule which is robust to model
uncertainty across the set of non-nested models: the basic New Keynesian model, backward-
looking model in style of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and a hybrid New Keynesian model
with backward-looking elements (Fuhrer, 2000). Most of these works analyse the sets of
models with competing perspectives about expectations formation and inflation persistence.
In this paper the focus is different. I am motivated by presence of uncertainty about
financial factors in DSGE model; therefore I analyze models that are different with respect
to financial frictions incorporated in them. In other respects the considered models are
similar: in particular, with respect to presence of nominal rigidities in imperfect competition
environment, with respect to inflation persistence and expectations’ formation. First, this
setup allows to see, what impact do different financial factors have on welfare-optimizing
policy rules. Second, it reveals whether difference between amplification mechanisms in the
models is big enough to generate non-robustness of optimal monetary policy rules. Relevance
of robustness’ study in this context is stipulated by the fact that adhering to a model
that does not capture the ”true” type of financial frictions might entail harmful welfare
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consequences. Thus, I characterize policy rules optimal for each of the models and evaluate
welfare consequences of adopting suboptimal policy rules in all the model economies. I also
attempt to find policy rules that produce acceptable welfare outcomes in all the models
considered: basic New Keynesian model (BNK) , financial accelerator (FA) model and a
model with collateral constraints (HCC); I assume that all the models have equal weights as
possible representation of economy.
I show that policy rule optimal for the BNK model is not robust to model uncertainty:
welfare costs of adhering to it in alternative model economies with frictions are significant,
being particularly high for the HCC model. This happens despite the fact that all the mod-
els considered put non-competing perspectives about expectations formation and inflation
persistence. To see the contribution of financial factors to non-robustness of BNK rule I sim-
ulate FA and HCC models with financial frictions in them being inactive. When financial
accelerator and collateral constraints mechanisms are ”turned off”, baseline New Keynesian
optimal policy rule yields acceptable welfare outcomes in the FA and the HCC models.
Hence, presence of financial factors is the source of fragility of FA and HCC models and the
reason of baseline New Keynesian optimal rule non-robustness to model uncertainty.
I demonstrate that policy rules optimal for the FA model and HCC model are robust
across the given model set: adopting them in all the models produces acceptable levels of
welfare costs. Despite different mechanisms of financial accelerator and collateral constraints
- the former works through interaction between firms net worth and their demand for capital,
while the latter operates through collateral constraints being tied to housing values on firm
and household levels - and despite different types of exogenous shocks hitting economy, both
the FA and HCC models call for policy rate to respond to fluctuations in output. In other
words, optimal policy in the models with financial factors requires direct output stabilization.
This contrasts with optimal policy in the basic New Keynesian setup, when a policymaker
aims at price stability and targets inflation, what is sufficient for attainment of the efficient
allocation.
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Finally, by employing fault tolerance methodology, i.e. by considering welfare implications
of deviations from the optimal policies, I obtain the set of policy formulations that are robust
to model uncertainty. I demonstrate that significant increase of output coefficient in the
policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian model results in this rule being robust. I
also ascertain that modest changes of parameter values in financial accelerator and collateral
constraints models optimal rules do not entail negative welfare consequences. Moreover,
welfare improves in the BNK model when increasing interest rate smoothing coefficient in
both FA and HCC models’ optimal rules.
Monetary policy is modeled here in terms of optimal simple implementable interest rate
rules (as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006, Faia and Monacelli, 2005 and Mendicino and
Pescatori, 2005). I assume that policymaker is able to commit to a rule. Rules simplic-
ity means that policy rate is a function of a small number of easily observable variables;
implementability calls for unique rational expectations equilibrium delivered by a policy
rule. Optimality criterion I use is utility-based welfare maximization (as in Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2006 and Faia and Monacelli, 2005). This criterion differs from a conventional
approach applied in literature on model uncertainty, which is a quadratic loss function mini-
mization (used, for example, in Cogley and Sargent, 2005, Levin and Williams, 2003, Cogley
et al., 2011). On one hand, using welfare maximization to estimate parameters of optimal
simple rules allows to stay consistent with microfoundations of the models. On the other
hand, this criterion is also not ideal, because within welfare maximization framework it is
complicated to incorporate preferences of a policymaker that could affect policy efficiency1.
Aiming at consistency with models microfoundations, this paper uses maximization of wel-
fare as a criterion of optimality.
In presenting results this paper follows an extension to the model averaging approach
proposed by Brock et al. (2007). This extension consists in reporting not only the robust
1For example, Caplin and Leahy (1996) and Goodhart (1996) refer to institutional reasons why policy-
maker might have preference to avoid interest rate reversals. Lowe and Ellis (1997) advocate for relevance
of policymakers preferences she might have due to concerns about financial market fragility.
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policy rule, but also the effects of model uncertainty, so that a policymaker knows how
the form of robust rule is affected by specific characteristics of divergent models taken into
account. I disclose degrees of outcome dispersion - how losses associated with optimal policy
depend on models - and action dispersion - how optimal policy differs across alternative
models.
Another extension of the model averaging approach adopted here is the fault tolerance
methodology suggested by Levin and Williams (2003). The aim here is to use fault tolerance
approach to ascertain whether robust policy could be attained by appropriate amendment
of non-robust monetary policy rule and whether under robust policy rule welfare could
be improved across the models by deviating from optimal policy. I propose an extension
to this approach here and evaluate how tolerant are model economies in welfare sense to
deviations from all the optimal policy rules, what enables me to establish whether and how
a policymaker could promote welfare in alternative economy representations by amending
a particular policy rule she chooses to follow. I find that modified policy rule optimal for
the basic New Keynesian model is robust when output coefficient is sufficiently increased.
Though, this modified policy rule is not optimal for any of the models (it does not deliver
the highest level of welfare in any of the models), it yields acceptable welfare outcomes in
all model economies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents three models analyzed for robustness
of monetary policy. Section 3 presents the monetary policy setup, welfare measure and
discusses the results of robustness analysis. Section 4 investigates fault tolerance of the
models. Section 5 concludes.
2 The models
To analyse the impact of different amplification mechanisms on monetary policy robust-
ness the models studied here are similar in many respects but financial frictions. The suite
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of models includes a basic New Keynesian (BNK) model, a financial accelerator (FA) model
and a model with housing and collateral constraints (HCC) model. All the models are
forward-looking, contain no inflation persistence and account for nominal stickiness and mo-
nopolistic competition. In all the models monetary policy plays an active role in stabilizing
economy because of short-term nominal inertia. All the models incorporate monetary policy
and technology shocks. In what follows I briefly introduce main characteristics of the models.
Detailed exposition of the models is given in Walsh (2010), Christensen and Dib (2008) and
Iacoviello (2005). Equilibrium conditions and parameters calibration used for simulations
are given in the Appendices A-C.
2.1 Basic New Keynesian model
The basic New Keynesian model is a benchmark model for monetary policy analysis. It
has practically become a consensus between empirical relevance, theoretical foundations and
oractical usefulness. BNK does not incorporate any financial factors and is a useful bench-
mark. The BNK model (Clarida et al., 1999) accounts for purely forward-looking output
and inflation; dynamics is entirely due to exogenous force processes without endogenous
persistence; outcomes depend on agents’ expectations. The baseline BNK model features no
investment and capital. Equilibrium conditions and calibrated parameter values for BNK
model are given in Appendix A.
The version of the BNK model studied here is taken in its standard form as in Walsh
(2010). Government spending is added to the model to introduce demand side (government
spending) shocks that are absent in the model’s formulation in Walsh. Three types of exoge-
nous disturbances are accounted by the BNK model here: shock to government spending,
productivity shock and monetary policy shock.
BNK model features a negative effect of interest rate on output. Current output depends
on expectations of future consumption. Nominal prices are set based on future marginal
costs; this indicates no inertia in inflation. Inflation ultimately depends on movements in
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marginal costs, associated with variation in excess demand. The monetary policy rule that
closes the model is presented in the section 3. It has been demonstrated in the literature
that efficiency is fully restored in the BNK model when policy stabilizes economy’s average
markup at frictionless level (Walsh, 2010; Gali, 2008).
2.2 Financial accelerator model
This model adopts financial accelerator (FA) framework developed in Bernanke et al.
(1989). It incorporates credit market frictions by modeling borrowers and lenders of capital
explicitly into an otherwise standard New Keynesian setup with nominal stickiness and
monopolistic competition. Frictions arise from agency problem caused by informational
asymmetries (profitability of borrowers is private information) and entailed agency costs
between borrowers and lenders. In the costly state verification setup (Townsend, 1979) the
optimal contract is a standard debt contract where entrepreneur’s payment is independent
of realization of her idiosyncratic productivity. When entrepreneur cannot repay, the lender
pays verification cost as a share of entrepreneurs assets and takes over her entire project.
So, FA model manifests the cost of external funds higher than the cost of internal funds and
thus, sets out how procyclical net worth of borrowers affects demand for investments, giving
rise to shocks amplification. Thus, exogenous disturbances are propagated in the FA model
due to the fact that net worth depends on return to capital disproportionally due to the
leverage effect.
Here the FA model specification follows Christensen and Dib (2008). Apart from monetary
policy and productivity shocks, the FA model features preference shock, money demand
shock and investment specific shock. As argued in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen
and Dib (2008), investment specific shock is an important exogenous force driving FA model
economy; provided with sufficient disturbance of investment specific shock FA model explains
important features of business cycle data. The role of financial accelerator mechanism in
investment fluctuations depends on the nature of the shock generating them. Financial
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accelerator amplifies and propagates the effects on investment of demand shocks - monetary
policy, money demand and preference shocks. At the same time financial accelerator pushes
down the response of investment to supply side shocks - technology and investment-efficiency
shocks (Christensen and Dib, 2008). Real distortions introduced to this model imply that
there is a trade-off for a policymaker between inflation and output stabilization. It has
been shown by Edge (2003) that lifetime utility-based welfare of the model with endogenous
capital without financial accelerator could be approximated by variances of inflation, output
gap and investment spending gap. Equilibrium conditions and calibrated parameter values
for the FA model are given in Appendix B.
2.3 Model with collateral constraints
This New Keynesian model accounts for housing and collateral constraints (HCC) and
incorporates three types of agents: entrepreneurs, impatient (liquidity-constrained) and pa-
tient (unconstrained) households. The source of friction in this model is difference in discount
rates of different agents. As proposed by Iacoviello (2005), HCC model incorporates housing
used by the borrowers - entrepreneurs and constrained households - as collateral.
The HCC model incorporates rich endogenous propagation mechanism that conducts ex-
ogenous disturbances to affect output: beyond workings of financial accelerator the change
of asset prices affects borrowing capacity of the debtors. Assuming that constrained house-
holds have a strong preference for current consumption, growing housing prices induce more
than proportional rise of borrowing and consumption, which in its turn has an influence on
aggregate demand. Debt deflation also contributes to the changes in value of the borrowers
net worth. Thus the demand shocks are amplified in the HCC model. At the same time
inflation depresses the impact of supply shocks that induce negative correlation between
output and inflation. So, the impact of supply shocks in this model is contracted in the
same way as in the FA model. In addition to monetary policy and productivity shocks the
HCC model accounts for cost-push shock, housing price shock and preference for housing
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shock. It has been shown by Andres et al. (2010) that lifetime utility-based welfare could be
approximated by variances of inflation, output gap, consumption gap between constrained
and unconstrained households and distribution of housing between three groups of agents.
The specification of the HCC model used here is taken from Iacoviello (2005) unaltered.
Equilibrium conditions and calibrated parameter values for HCC model are set in Appendix
C.
3 Monetary Policy and Welfare Measure
I assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of interest rate rule - a plan for
the path of interest rate that a policymaker commits to abide by forever. This rule provides
a clear policy objective, but in reality there is a room for discretion. Interest rate reaction
function is simple, optimal and implementable in style of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
Their formulation is that, first, interest rate should be a function of a small number of easily
observable variables. Second, this reaction function should maximize social welfare. Third,
the rule should deliver a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
I assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of policy rule of the following form:
ln(rt/r) = ρ ∗ ln(rt−1/r) + αpi ∗ ln(pit/pi) + αy ∗ ln(yt/y) + t (1)
where rt is the gross nominal interest rate, pit is inflation rate and yt is output. The variables
without subscripts denote steady state values of these variables. Thus, this policy rule
features deviations of each variable from its steady state value. The parameter values in the
BNK and HCC models are calibrated such that the steady state value of inflation is set to
zero.
I assume that policymaker commits to the rule (1) and maximizes social welfare subject to
the models’ equilibrium conditions and to a policy rule to find optimal parameter values ρ, αpi
and αy. Welfare in the BNK model could be approximated by a quadratic loss function, which
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is a weighted sum of inflation and output gap variances (see Woodford (2003), Gali (2008)
and Walsh (2010)). FA and HCC models have more complex structures featuring financial
distortions. Approximation of representative agent welfare in FA and HCC frameworks in
the context of linear-quadratic approach has not been implemented yet to the best of our
knowledge. In this paper welfare is evaluated numerically.
To draw inferences about robustness of optimal rules I run each of three model economies
with all the policy rules and evaluate welfare costs of adopting suboptimal rules in them.
First, I evaluate welfare in the BNK, FA and HCC models sequentially applying alternative
specifications of (1), which are three simple policy rules evaluated as being optimal (i.e.
maximize welfare of representative agent) for the models. Second, I compute welfare costs
of adopting alternative rules relative to the equilibrium path associated with the optimal
rule. In doing this I rely on second-order approximation of the model’s solution. The first-
order approximation is not acceptable for the purpose of welfare comparison, because the
implied expected values of variables coincide with their non-stochastic steady state; as a
result, the volatility effect on variables is neglected (more on this is in Kim and Kim (2003)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006)) and all alternative policy rules yield the same level of
variables in non-stochastic steady state.
The welfare associated with the optimal policy rule conditional on a particular state of
the economy in period 0 is:
W˜0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C˜t, N˜t) (2)
where E0 is conditional expectation over the initial state and C˜t and N˜t are contingent
plans for consumption and hours worked under the optimal policy rule. Analogously, the
welfare associated with the alternative policy rule conditional on a particular initial state of
economy is an appropriate aggregation of contingent plans for consumption and hours under
an alternative rule Cat and N
a
t :
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W a0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cat , N
a
t ) (3)
The use of conditionally expected discounted utility of the representative agent allows to ac-
count for transitional effects from non-stochastic steady state to an equilibrium path implied
by alternative policy rules.
Welfare costs λ are measured as a fraction of consumption a representative household
would agree to be compensated with in order to gain the same level of welfare as under the
optimal rule:
W0,λ = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cat (1 + λ), N
a
t ) = W˜0 (4)
The level of λ for the HCC model is obtained by solving (4) for the given specification of
utility function in HCC model (Appendix C):
λ = exp((W˜0 −W a0 ) ∗ (1− β))− 1 (5)
In calculating welfare cost for the HCC model I only account for welfare of patient (uncon-
strained) households; welfare of entrepreneurs and constrained households is disregarded as
fractions of their consumption in the total welfare in negligibly small.
Because it is impossible to derive the level of λ analytically for the BNK and FA models
given complex utility functions specifications, I evaluate welfare costs for these models by
numerical search for λ over the grid so that condition (4) is satisfied.
An alternative measure of optimality - policymaker’s loss function minimization - is also
used here. This optimality criterion is commonly used in literature on monetary policy
robustness2. Period objective function of policymaker takes the form:
2Quadratic loss function minimization as an optimality criterion is used in Clarida et al. (1999), Cogley
and Sargent (2005), Levin and Williams (2003), Cogley et al. (2011), etc.
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L = var(pit) + λy ∗ var(yt) + λ∆rt ∗ var(∆rt) (6)
This loss function approximates representative agent welfare appropriately only for the
BNK model. The use of this loss function for the other models is justified by the fact that
policymaker might have preferences for inflation targeting, interest rate smoothing and out-
put gap stabilization. Ability of loss function (6) to capture different types of policymaker’s
preferences makes this optimality criterion more flexible than representative agent welfare
maximization. For example, setting λy and λ∆rt to zero lets to consider the case of strict
inflation targeting policy. Setting λy = 1 enables to analyse the case of equal preferences for
inflation and output gap stabilization, whereas λy = 2 is the case of strong preference for
output gap stabilization. Besides, not utilising the representative agent assumption could
be regarded as an advantage of this approach as it could be misleading for welfare distri-
bution/inequality analysis. As argued in Levin and Williams (2003), there is no consensus
about the ”correct” values of weighting λy and λ∆rt parameters. In this paper I use loss func-
tion specification for the grid of values for λy and λ∆rt : λy = 0, 0.5, 1 and 2 and λ∆rt = 0, 0.5
and 1. Here I only report results for two sets of preferences: strict inflation targeting (λy = 0
and λ∆rt = 0) and inflation and output gap stabilization (λy = 1 and λ∆rt = 0).
For each model I search numerically for parameter values ρ, αpi and αy that maximize
households’ welfare. I also search for values of ρ, αpi and αy that minimize policymaker’s loss
function. These parameter values specify optimal simple rules for every model. Parameter
ρ is restricted to lie on the interval [0, 0.99], αpi - on the interval [1, 3] (values below 1
result in rational expectations equilibrium indeterminacy) and αy - on the interval [0, 3]
3. In
this numerical search I solve the models to obtain second order approximation of the policy
functions around non-stochastic steady state. The parameters of the optimal policy rules
that maximize representative agent welfare are shown in Table 1.
3These intervals are conventional for the search of optimal parameter values in the literature (see, for
example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006). Values outside of these intervals are disregarded on the ground
that they don’t result in non-negligible welfare improvement.
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Table 1: Models’ optimal rules - utility-based welfare maximization
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.52 3 0
FA 0.16 3 0.78
HCC 0 3 0.86
Policy rule optimal for the BNK model features strong reaction to variations in inflation
(αpi = 3), no response to output gap (αy = 0) and a moderate degree of interest rate
smoothing (ρ = 0.52), what is a well-known result for this type of model (see, for example,
the result of optimal simple rules evaluation in Justiniano et al. (2013), Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006) or in Levin and Williams (2003)). The FA optimal rule is characterized
by the sizable reaction to deviations of output (αy = 0.78), strong responses to inflation
(αpi = 3) and a relatively small degree of policy rate inertia (ρ = 0.165). Rule optimal for
the HCC model features the strongest among all the models reaction to output fluctuations
(αy = 0.86), strong reaction to inflation (αpi = 3) and no interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0).
All the models’ optimal rules feature importance of inflation stabilization: αpi coefficient
takes its highest possible value 3 in all the rules. This happens due to presence of nominal
rigidities and due to inflation being forward-looking in all the models. Price dispersion is
the main source of welfare costs in all the models, hence the call to minimize it. The rules
differ in their ρ and αy values. In the FA and HCC rules larger response of policy rate
to deviations in output and small/no degree of interest rate smoothing characterize their
aggressiveness. First, presence of real distortions in the FA and HCC models implies that
”divine coincidence” does not hold in them. Thus, a policymaker faces trade-off in output
and inflation stabilization. The FA and HCC optimal rules call for sizable response to
output fluctuations, what makes them more aggressive comparing to the BNK rule. In the
baseline NK model optimal policy replicates flexible price equilibrium allocation (Gali, 2008);
strict inflation targeting is optimal in this model as policymaker does not face a meaningful
policy trade-off. Second, absence or very small interest rate inertia in the FA and HCC rules
features their aggressiveness, because it implies that policy rate should only react to variables’
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fluctuations in the current period with no backward-looking component in it. This constrasts
with the sizable degree of inertia of the BNK policy rule that calls for more cautious policy in
the short run4. Smoother changes in policy rate are welfare-improving in the baseline model,
because they facilitate agents to anticipate policy and predict interest rate and thus improve
short run trade-off between output and inflation stabilization in absence of real distortions.
Optimal policy rules are different not only due to different amplification mechanisms
in the models, but also because of different structure of optimality criteria. Utility-based
welfare measure of the BNK model can be appriximated by the weighted average of infla-
tion and output variability5, what is not the case for the financial frictions models. Linear
quadratic approximation of welfare measure for the FA model includes investment spending
gap, so that the composition of output matters in this model6. Welfare losses in the collat-
eral constraints model have been shown to be approximated by variability of consumption
gap between constrained and unconstrained households and distribution of housing between
firms, constrained and unconstrained households7. Thus, it would be inappropriate to see the
source of welfare losses in the FA and HCC models only in inflation and output variability.
Table 2: Conditional welfare costs
Model BNK rule FA rule HCC rule
BNK 0 0.002 0.003
FA 1.16 0 0.001
HCC 7.67 0.06 0
FA no frictions 0.55 n/a n/a
HCC no frictions 1.66 n/a n/a
FA no frictions and model-specific shocks 0.21 n/a n/a
HCC no frictions and model-specific shocks 0.64 n/a n/a
Conditional welfare costs are measured by λ ∗ 100%.
Evaluation results of welfare costs of following suboptimal policy rules in all the model
economies are shown in the Table 2. BNK rule adopted in the FA model entails welfare costs
4Significant interest rate smoothing as an optimal policy has also been found by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006)
5See Woodford (2003), Walsh (2010), Gali (2008), etc.
6This is demonstrated in Edge (2003).
7Demostrated in Andres at al. (2010).
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of 1.16% of consumption, in the HCC model - 7.67% of consumption. These are unacceptable
levels of welfare losses8. Adopting the FA and the HCC rules delivers acceptable welfare
losses in all the models with the losses being the smallest on average in the case of HCC
rule. Hence, the HCC rule would be the first-best to adopt in case of model uncertainty
about financial factors. At the same time the HCC model is themost fragile to suboptimal
policy formulations, as welfare losses in the HCC model are the highest: 7.67% under the
BNK rule and 0.06% under the FA rule9.
BNK optimal rule yields welfare detrimental outcomes in the models with financial fric-
tions due to absence of reaction to output fluctuations in this rule10. High welfare costs in
this case are due to real imperfections and increased variability of output. Thus, BNK rule
is not robust to model uncertainty.
The parameters of the optimal policy rules that minimize loss function are shown in
Tables 3 (for the case of strict inflation targeting) and 4 (for a policymaker’s preference
for both inflation and output gap stabilization). I include Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
macroeconometric model (RS) in the set of models here. This model does not have mi-
crofoundations, so it is impossible to analyse it together with other New Keynesian models
when utility-based welfare optimality criterion is used. However, ths is a feasible exercise
when the loss function minimization optimality criterion is utilized.
Table 3: Models’ optimal rules - quadratic loss function minimization. Strict inflation tar-
geting.
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.85 3 0
FA 0.5 3 0
HCC 0.85 3 0
RS 0.7 2.15 1.5
Results of loss function minimization show that in the case of strict inflation targeting
8I am following here an informal threshold of 0.8− 1% of consumption level as being unacceptable as in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
9The same result of the most fragile model yielding the most robust policy rule has been obtained by
Cogley et al. (2011)
10This is shown in the Section 4 of the paper, where fault tolerance of all the models is analyzed.
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all New Keynesian models (BNK, FA and HCC) have similar type of optimal policy rules.
In all the model economies it in not optimal to respond to deviations of output gap αy = 0,
whereas responses to inflation are strong: αpi = 3 (Table 3).
Table 4: Models’ optimal rules - quadratic loss function minimization. Inflation and output
gap stabilization.
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.7 2.2 0.4
FA 0.35 2.9 2.6
HCC 0.9 1.4 2.7
RS 0.1 2.4 2.6
To check whether these are financial factors that are responsible for non-robustness of
the baseline policy rule, the BNK rule is adopted in the FA and HCC model economies
where financial frictions are inactive. Financial accelerator mechanism is ”switched off” in
the FA model by breaking the connection between the external finance premium and the net
worth position of borrowers (details of this are in the Appendix B). This leads to the fact
that external funding of entrepreneurs, and thus their demand for capital, does not depend
on their leverage ratio anymore. Hence, the FA model with inactive financial accelerator
becomes a NK model with capital and capital adjustment costs (so, it is still different from
the baseline NK model in this). Collateral constraints mechanism is deactivated by closing
asset price channel - price of housing does not affect firms’ and households’ abilities to borrow;
housing/consumtion margin conditions are modified in the set of equilibrium conditions of
the HCC model to account for that. Besides, debt is not nominal, but indexed: borrowing
constraints of firms and constrained households are amended to take it into account (details
are provided in the Appendix C). This experiment of running the BNK optimal rule in
the FA and HCC models without frictions shows that the baseline-optimal policy performs
well in these models: welfare losses in them are 0.55% and 1.66%, what is substantially
smaller than the losses in the full-version FA and HCC models. A part of these welfare
costs can be attributed to the workings of model-specifc shocks: investment-specifc and
preference shocks in the FA model and housing and cost-push shock in the HCC model.
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When model-specific shocks, included in the models in order to improve performance of
frictions’ amplification mechanism are also deactivated, the baseline rule is robust, what
is demonstrated by acceptable level of welfare losses in the FA and the HCC models in
this case. Thus, deactivating the frictions and model-specific shocks in the FA and HCC
models (effectively means deactivating real imperfections in these models) removes the trade-
off between inlfation and output stabilization; this observation is consistent to the results
obtained by Justiniano et al. (2012). No trade-off implies that the rule, optimal for the
baseline model, performes well enough in alternative models. Thereby it is shown that
financial factors are the principal reason for the BNK rule being non-robust.
Welfare losses in various models under alternative policy rules are not symmetrical. The
BNK model is not sensitive to suboptimal policy rules: welfare costs of adopting suboptimal
rules are negligibly small: 0.002% of consumption under the FA optimal rule and 0.003%
under the HCC optimal rule. Therefore, sizable response to output fluctuations (captured
by positive value of output coefficient αy) in the BNK economy does not deteriorate welfare
substantially. Thus, the baseline model is tolerant to changes in policy rule11.
Another important feature of the FA and HCC optimal rules is that the FA and HCC
models are mutually tolerant to adopting suboptimal policy rules: the FA model welfare loss
under the HCC rule is 0.001% and the HCC model welfare loss under the FA rule is 0.06% of
consumption. This happens due to similarity of the FA and HCC optimal policies. Though
the amplification mechanisms and shocks are different in the FA and HCC models, these
models call for similar policy responses. As a result, both the FA and the HCC optimal
rules are robust to model uncertainty about financial factors within given set of models.
Adopting the FA and HCC policy rules entails acceptable welfare costs in all alternative
model economies with the smallest losses entailed by following the HCC rule.
11this is also demonstrated by the means of fault tolerance analysis in the Section 4.
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4 Fault Tolerance
The fault tolerance approach was initially proposed for analysis of monetary policy ro-
bustness by Levin and Williams (2003). This method is a test of how tolerant models are
to deviations from optimal policy. In this section I argue that the original version of fault
tolerance approach by Levin and Williams (2003) should be amended to enable obtain robust
policy rules and to help find rules that improve welfare across the models. I use the proposed
extension of fault tolerance approach to show how BNK policy rule could be modified so that
it becomes robust.
Levin and Williams (2003) advocate fault tolerance as a methodology to evaluate sen-
sitivity of models to deviations from optimal policies. Although it seems to be a natural
extension, they don’t propose to test particular policy rules for robustness within fault toler-
ance methodology. In short, Levin and Williams demonstrate that a model’s tolerance is to
be analysed only with respect to deviations from policy rule, which is optimal for this partic-
ular model. Deviations from suboptimal policy rules are not examined, though it is exactly
what should be evaluated to find robust policy rules, because it is by changing parameters
of a specific policy rule (optimal for one model and suboptimal for alternative models) how
a non-robust policy could be modified to be robust.
The original proposal of Levin and Williams is to fix two out of three parameter values
(for example, αpi and αy if sensitivity to deviations in ρ are analysed) at the different levels
for different models - levels that correspond to their optimal values and that are not the
same for all the alternative models, - and to analyse welfare implications of the change in
one paramter (in this example, ρ) for all the models. Thus, every model is tested for fault
tolerance only to deviations from its own optimal policy. Levin and Williams argue that in
order for a robust policy rule to be attainable, there should be acceptable welfare losses on
overlapping intervals for all three policy rule parameters. They claim that if loss function
is relatively insensitive to changes in all three parameters then there exists a robust policy;
and for that to be the case there should be overlapping regions of high fault tolerance of all
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the models with respect to changes in all the parameters of the policy rule.
However, a robust rule across the set of models cannot have different parameter vales for
different models. A robust rule a policymaker is interested in is a specific rule that works well
in all alternative models. Hence, it is one rule for all the models; the welfare implications
of following this rule are acceptable in all the model economies for the specific parameter
values. Levin and Williams’ method does not test for this because their approach is limited to
analysing deviations only from optimal rules; suboptimal rules are disregarded. Therefore,
the original fault tolerance methodology is not useful to see whether losses in alternative
models are acceptable when one particular policy is adopted and when deviations from this
policy are allowed for.
Thus, I suggest that the original fault tolerance methodology is to be extended. This
extension consists in testing the models’ tolerance to deviations from all the optimal policy
rules for all the models. In the context of this paper of three models and three-parameter
type of policy rule nine experiments of parameters’ deviations from their optimal values are
to be conducted. Then robust rule is attainable if there is at least one out of nine cases where
the interval of overlapping acceptable losses is present. This amendment of fault tolerance
approach allows to see if modification of any of three optimal rules could result in this rule
being robust. Besides, it allows to find the values of parameters in the robust policy rule.
The results of applying the extended fault tolerance methodology are presented graphi-
cally in the Appendix D. Deviations from the optimal policies are implemented in order to
search for the possible cases where changing one parameter of an optimal policy improves
welfare, i.e. reduces welfare costs, in the alternative models.
Allowing for changes in the value of ρ parameter in the BNK optimal rule leads to diver-
gent welfare outcomes. Lower values of ρ (less inertial policy rule) reduce welfare costs in
the FA model. However, losses in the HCC model are not sensitive to any changes in ρ as
long as other parameters take their BNK-optimal values (αpi = 3 and αy = 0): welfare costs
are at their unacceptably high level of more than 7% for all the possible values of ρ. Thus,
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changing the degree of interest rate smoothing in the BNK optimal rule does not help to
improve welfare in the HCC model.
Instead, the situation is different when changes of output coefficient in the BNK-optimal
rule are considered (Appendix D, Figure 3). Increasing αy parameter from its optimal value
of 0 to 0.6-1.2 reduces welfare losses in the models wtih frictions to acceptable levels: both
FA and HCC economies generate welfare losses close to zero when αy lies on interval [0.6,
1.2]. Hence, by modifying BNK-optimal rule policymaker could attain its robustness for a
particular set of output coefficient parameter values.
Increasing the value of ρ coefficient in the FA optimal rule from its optimal value of
0.165 up to 0.6 brings about reduction of welfare losses in the BNK model economy. At the
same time welfare losses on the HCC and FA models don’t increase much as a result of this
change. Thus, if FA optimal policy rule is adopted by a policymaker, making interest rate
more inertial would result in improvement of welfare across the set of the models. (However,
further increase of coefficient of interest rate inertia would result in sharp increase of welfare
losses in the FA model - see Figure 4 in Appendix D.)
Changing inflation and output coefficients in the FA optimal rule don’t result in wel-
fare costs decrease (Appendix 4, Figures 5 and 6): optimal values of the FA rule generate
the smallest possible welfare costs, thus, no need to modify them in order to attain an in-
crease in welfare; changes in inflation and output coefficients αpi and αy only lead to welfare
deterioration.
Fault tolerance analysis of changes in HCC optimal policy rule gives similar results as
deviations of the FA rule parameters. Interest rate inertia coefficient ρ being increased up to
0.7 results in welfare improvement throughout the models (Appendix D, Table 7). However,
for the values ρ > 0.7 welfare costs in FA economy increase up to unacceptable high levels,
thus only values of ρ less than 0.7 are welfare improving. Deviations of αpi and αy from their
optimal values in the HCC optimal policy rule don’t lead to any improvement is welfare; the
minimum welfare costs are achieved in all the models for the HCC rule parameter values
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fixed at their optimal values.
To conclude, fault tolerance analysis enables to ascertain whether changes of parameter
values in optimal policy rules could lead to improvement of welfare as a result of changes in
policy rules. Modifying the BNK-ooptimal rule by increasing its output coefficient to any
value in the interval [0.6, 1.4] makes this rule be robust. Though, the amended BNK rule is
not optimal for any of the models, applying it in all the model economies entails acceptable
levels of welfare losses. Besides, applying the fault tolerance methodology enables to find
out whether deviations of parameter values in robust rules could improve welfare. Greater
value of interest rate inertia coefficient in the FA and HCC policy rules (up to 0.6 in the FA
case and 0.7 in the HCC case) results in the welfare improvement in the BNK model.
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5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that financial frictions matter for robustness on monetary policy
rule. It is shown that strict inflation targeting could be welfare detrimental in the models
with financial factors. When there is uncertainty about what financial factors are at work and
thus it is not evident what type of frictions - financial accelerator or collateral constraints -
should be used in a reference model for optimal policy rule derivation, basic New Keynesian
model should not be used by a policymaker to infer policy robust to model uncertainty
unless the rule would be appropriately modified. I establish that BNK optimal rule yields
high welfare losses in alternative models because of financial frictions present in these models.
I show that the model with collateral constraints is the most fragile: it suffers the highest
welfare costs under the baseline NK model policy formulation. Policy rules optimal for
the financial accelerator model and the model with collateral constraints deliver acceptable
levels of welfare losses in all the alternative model economies and thus are robust. Hence a
policymaker minimizes the risk of welfare losses by using either of the models with financial
factors as a reference to obtain an optimal policy rule.
I show how by using the extended version of the fault tolerance approach (Levin and
Williams, 2003) one can determine specification of policy that is robust to model uncertainty
across the set of models. Sizable increase of output coefficient in the policy rule optimal for
the basic New Keynesian model results in this rule being robust as it delivers satisfactory
welfare outcomes in all the models.
A number of questions should be answered in order to have a strategy to address model
uncertainty for the purposes of policymaking. First, it is crucial to establish, what models
should be used in the set of alternative economy representations. As seen in the literature,
specification of robust policy is sensitive to the set of alternative models considered (Cogley
et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2008; Brock et al., 2003; Levin and Williams, 2003). Thus, it is
critical to verify what models have to be accounted for in quest of robust policy. Relevance of
this point increases in light of development of many variants of models with divergent finan-
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cial factors aiming to capture mechanisms conductive to economic distress. It is conceivable
that not all alternative models should be considered as possible representations of economy
when looking for robust policy. Second, the analysis here could be extended by monetary
policy rule incorporating other variables (in addition to inflation, output and interest rate).
For example, policymaker could respond to changes in leverage ratio - this could improve
stabilization properties of monetary policy rules in the models with financial factors. An-
other extention of this paper could be to analyse robustness with respect to other types of
financial frictions, for example, disruptions of financial intermediation, asset prices bubbles,
etc., as these factors could possibly affect the results regarding robustness obtained here.
Additionally, Bayesian updating could be used, so that prior beliefs about the probabilities
of each model being a true one and their updating are incorporated in the analysis (as in
Cogley et al., 2011 or Brock et al., 2007).
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Appendix A
Basic New Keynesian model: equilibrium conditions (Walsh, 2010). Variables without
time subscripts denote steady state values of these variables.
c−σt = β ∗ Et(rt ∗
c−σt+1
pit+1
)
χ ∗ n
η
t
c−σt
= wt
mct =
wt
zt
1 = ω ∗ piθ−1t + (1− ω) ∗ p1−θt
x1,t = c
1−σ
t ∗mct + ω ∗ β ∗ x1,t+1 ∗ piθt+1
x2,t = c
1−σ
t + ω ∗ β ∗ x2,t+1 ∗ piθ−1t+1
pt =
θ
θ − 1 ∗
x1,t
x2,t
yt = zt ∗ nt
yt = ct + gt
ln (zt) = ρz ∗ ln (zt−1) + z,t
ln (gt/g) = ρg ∗ ln (gt−1/g) + g,t
ln (rt/r) = ρ ∗ ln (rt−1/r) + αpi ∗ ln (pit/pi) + αy ∗ ln (yt/y) + r,t
Representative agent utility function:
U(Ct, Nt) =
c1−σt
1− σ − χ ∗
n1+ηt
1 + η
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Table 5: Variables and parameters
Description Notation
Household consumption ct
Household labour supply nt
Marginal costs mct
Government spending gt
Output yt
Productivity zt
Real aggregate price level pt
Inflation pit
Gross nominal interest rate rt
Real wage wt
Productivity shock innovation z,t
Shock to government spending innovation g,t
Monetary policy shock innovation r,t
Auxiliary variables x1,t, x2,t
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi, αy
Table 6: Calibrated parameter values
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.9902
Relative risk aversion σ 2
Weight of labour in the utility function χ 1
Labour supply aversion η 3
Calvo parameter ω 0.75
Price elasticity of demand for each good variety θ 6
Steady state share of government consumption g 0.17
Persistence of productivity shocks ρz 0.8556
Persistence of government spending shocks ρg 0.87
Standard deviation of innovation to productivity shock σz 0.0064
Standard deviation of innovation to government spending shock σg 0.016
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.0031
Note: The driving forces gt and zt are calibrated based on estimations of Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006). Monetary policy shock innovation is calibrated based on estimation of
Ireland (2004).
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Appendix B
Financial accelerator model: equilibrium conditions (Christensen and Dib, 2008). Hatted
variables denote log-deviations of these variables from steady state values. Variables without
time subscripts denote steady state values of these variables.
((1− γ) ∗ λ ∗ c− 1) ∗ cˆt = γ ∗ λˆ+ λ ∗m ∗ (r − 1)/r ∗ (bˆt + (γ − 1) ∗ mˆt)− γ ∗ eˆt
γ ∗ rˆt/(r − 1) = bˆt + cˆt − mˆt
h ∗ hˆt = (1− h) ∗ (wˆt + λˆt)
yˆt = α ∗ kˆt + (1− α) ∗ hˆt + (1− α) ∗ Aˆt
yˆt ∗ y = c ∗ cˆt + i ∗ iˆt
wˆt = yˆt + ˆt − hˆt
zˆt = yˆt + ˆt − kˆt
µˆt = mˆt − m̂t−1 + pit
fˆt = z/f ∗ zˆt + (1− δ)/f ∗ qˆt − q̂t−1
qˆt = χ ∗ (iˆt − kˆt)− xˆt
pit = β ∗ ˆpit+1 + (1− β ∗ φ) ∗ (1− φ)/φ ∗ ˆt
λ̂t+1 = λˆt − rˆt + ˆpit+1
k̂t+1 = δ ∗ iˆt + δ ∗ xˆt + (1− δ) ∗ kˆt
f̂t+1 = rˆt − pit+1 + ψ ∗ (qˆt + k̂t+1 − n̂t+1)
n̂t+1/(υ∗f) = k/n∗fˆt−(k/n−1)∗(r̂t−1−pit)−ψ∗(k/n−1)∗(kˆt+ q̂t−1)+(ψ∗(k/n−1)+1)∗nˆt
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ln (rt/r) = ρ ∗ ln (rt−1/r) + αpi ∗ ln (pit/pi) + αy ∗ ln (yt/y) + r,t
eˆt = ρe ∗ êt−1 + e,t
bˆt = ρb ∗ b̂t−1 + b,t
Aˆt = ρA ∗ Ât−1 + A,t
xˆt = ρx ∗ x̂t−1 + x,t
To set financial accelerator mechanism inactive elasticity of external financial premium to
firm leverage ratio is appointed to be equal to zero: ψ = 0.
Representative agent utility function:
u(.) = γ ∗ et/(γ − 1) ∗ ln (c(γ−1)/γt + b(1/γ)t ∗m(γ−1)/γt ) + η ∗ ln(1− ht)
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Table 7: Variables and parameters
Description Notation
Household consumption ct
Household labour supply ht
Net worth nt
Government spending gt
Output yt
Productivity At
Gross nominal interest rate rt
Real wage wt
Lagrange multiplier λt
Real money balances mt
Aggregate capital kt
Aggregate investment it
Lagrange multiplier associated with production function t
Real marginal productivity of capital zt
Money growth µt
Inflation pit
Real interest rate on external borrowed funds ft
Price of capital qt
Weight of preference for consumption et
Money demand bt
Investment specific productivity xt
Preference shock innovation e,t
Money demand shock innovation b,t
Investment specific shock innovation x,t
Productivity shock innovation A,t
Shock to government spending innovation g,t
Monetary policy shock innovation r,t
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi, αy
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Table 8: Calibrated parameter values
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.9902
Gross steady state risk premium S 1.0075
Gross steady state inflation rate pi 1.0079
Intermediate goods elasticity of substitution θ 6
Constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances γ 0.0598
Weight of leisure in the utility function η 1.315
Price stickiness parameter φ 0.7418
Constant associated with money demand shock b 0.062
Capital adjustment costs paramter χ 0.5882
Capital share α 0.3384
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Steady state ratio of capital to net worth k/n 2
Probability of survival of entrepreneurs υ 0.9728
Elasticity of external finance premium to firm leverage ratio ψ 0.042
Persistence of productivity shocks ρA 0.7625
Persistence of money demand shock ρb 0.7206
Persistence of preference shock ρe 0.6156
Persistence of investment efficiency shock ρx 0.6562
Standard deviation of innovation to productivity shock σA 0.0096
Standard deviation of innovation to money demand shock σb 0.0103
Standard deviation of innovation to preference shock σe 0.0073
Standard deviation of innovation to investment efficiency shock σx 0.0331
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.0031
Note: Calibration is based on estimations of Chistensen and Dib (2008).
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Appendix C
Collateral constraints model: equilibrium conditions (Iacoviello, 2005). Hatted variables
denote log-deviations of these variables from steady state values. Variables with time sub-
scripts denote log-deviations of the steady state values of these variables. Variables without
time subscripts denote steady state values of these variables.
Yˆt = c/Y ∗ cˆt + c′/Y ∗ cˆ′t + c′′/Y ∗ ĉ′′t + I/Y ∗ Iˆt
cˆ′t = ĉ′t+1 − r̂rt
Iˆt − ˆKt−1 = γ ∗ (Ît+1 − Kˆt) + (1− γ ∗ (1− δ))/ψ ∗ (Ŷt+1 − X̂t+1 − Kˆt) + 1/ψ ∗ (cˆt − ĉt+1)
qˆt = γe∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γe)∗(Ŷt+1−X̂t+1−hˆt)−m∗β∗ r̂rt−(1−m∗β)∗∆ĉt+1−φe∗(∆hˆt−γ∆ĥt+1)
qˆt = γh∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γh)∗(Ĵt+1−ĥ′′t )−m′′∗β∗r̂rt−(1−m′′∗β)∗(ĉ′′t−ω∗ĉ′′t+1−φh∗(∆hˆ′′t−β′′∆ĥ′′t+1)
qˆt = β∗ ˆqt+1+(1−β)∗Ĵt+1+i∗hˆt+i′′∗ĥ′′t+cˆ′t−β∗ĉ′t+1+φh/h′∗(h∆hˆt+h′′∆ĥ′′t−β∗h∗∆∗ĥt+1−βh′′∆ĥ′′t+1)
bˆt = q̂t+1 + hˆt − rˆrt
bˆ′′t = q̂t+1 + hˆ′′t − rˆrt
Ŷt =
η
η − (1− υ − µ) ∗ (Aˆt+υ ∗ ĥt−1 +µ∗ K̂t−1)−
1− υ − µ
η − (1− υ − µ) ∗ (X̂t+α∗ cˆ
′
t+(1−α)∗ cˆ′′t )
pit = β ∗ ˆpit+1 − κ ∗ X̂t + uˆt
K̂t = δ ∗ Ît + (1− δ) ∗ K̂t−1
b/Y ∗ bˆt = c/Y ∗ cˆt+q∗h/Y∆hˆt+I/Y ∗ Î − t+Rb/Y (R̂t−1 + b̂t−1−pit)−(1−s′−s′′)(Ŷt−X̂t)
b′′/Y ∗ bˆ′′t = c′′/Y ∗ cˆ′′t + q ∗ h′′/Y∆hˆ′′t +Rb′′/Y (R̂t−1 + b̂′′t−1 − pit)− s′′(Ŷt − X̂t)
ln (rt/r) = ρ ∗ ln (rt−1/r) + αpi ∗ ln (pit/pi) + αy ∗ ln (yt/y) + r,t
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jˆt = ρj ∗ ĵt−1 + ˆj,t
uˆt = ρu ∗ ût−1 + ˆu,t
Aˆt = ρA ∗ Ât−1 + ˆA,t
ω = (β′′ −m′′β′′)/(1−m′′β)
i = (1− β)h/h′
i′′ = (1− β)h′′/h′
γh ≡ β′′ +m′′(β − β′′)
r̂rt ≡ R̂t − Etpit+1
γe ≡ m ∗ β + (1−m) ∗ γ
s′ ≡ (α(1− µ− υ) +X − 1)/X
s′′ ≡ (1− α)(1− µ− υ)/X
To close the effects of collateral constraints, housing/consumption margin conditions of en-
trepreneurs and impatient households are modified. so that the asset price channel is inactive:
qˆt = γe∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γe)∗(Ŷt+1−X̂t+1−hˆt)−ĉ′t+1∗(γ+1−γe)+cˆt−φe∗(hˆt−ĥt−1−γ∗(ĥt+1−hˆt))
qˆt = β
′′ ∗ ˆqt+1 + (1− γh) ∗ (jˆt − ĥ′′t )− ĉ′′t+1 ∗ β′′ + ĉ′′t − φh ∗ (ĥ′′t − ĥ′′t−1 − β′′ ∗ (ĥ′′t+1 − ĥ′′t ))
Representative agent utility function:
u(.) = ln(c′t) + j ln(h
′
t)− (L′t)η/η
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Table 9: Variables and parameters
Description Notation
Output yt
Entrepreneurs, patient and impatient households consumption ct, c
′
t, c
′′
t
Patient and impatient households labour supply L′t, L′′t
Entrepreneurs, patient and impatient households holding of housing ht, h
′
t, h
′′
t
Aggregate investment it
Aggregate capital kt
Markup Xt
Price of housing qt
Real borrowing, lending bt
Inflation pit
Gross nominal interest rate rt
Preference for housing jt
Productivity At
Inflation shock ut
Preference for housing shock innovation j,t
Cost-push shock innovation u,t
Productivity shock innovation A,t
Monetary policy shock innovation r,t
Auxiliary variables ωt, it, i
′′
t , γh
Ex ante real interest rate rrt
Income shares of patient and impatient households s, s
Slope of Phillips curve κ
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi, αy
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Table 10: Calibrated parameter values
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate of patient households β 0.99
Discount rate of impatient households β′′ 0.98
Discount rate of entrepreneurs γ 0.95
Weight on housing services j 0.1
Labour supply aversion η 1.01
Variable capital share µ 0.03
Elasticity of output to housing υ 0.03
Housing adjustment cost φe, φh 0
Variable capital adjustment costs ψ 2
Variable depreciation rate δ 0.03
Calvo parameter θ 0.75
Patient households wage share α 0.64
Loan-to-value entrepreneur m 0.89
Loan-to-value household m′′ 0.55
Steady state gross markup χ 1.05
Persistence of technology shock ρA 0.03
Persistence of housing preference shock ρj 0.85
Persistence of inflation shock ρu 0.59
Standard deviation of innovation to technology shock σA 2.24
Standard deviation of innovation to housing preference shock σj 24.89
Standard deviation of innovation to inflation shock σu 0.17
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.29
Note: Calibration is based on estimations of Iacoviello (2005).
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Appendix D
Fault tolerance analysis
Figure 1: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the BNK optimal rule
Figure 2: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the BNK optimal rule
Figure 3: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the BNK optimal rule
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Figure 4: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the FA optimal rule
Figure 5: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the FA optimal rule
Figure 6: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the FA optimal rule
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Figure 7: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the HCC optimal rule
Figure 8: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the HCC optimal rule
Figure 9: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the HCC optimal rule
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